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Do Politicians Take Risks Like the Rest of Us? An Experimental
Test of Prospect Theory Under MPs
Jona Linde
Maastricht University
Barbara Vis
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Political psychologists have been quick to use prospect theory in their work, realizing its potential for
explaining decisions under risk. Applying prospect theory to political decision-making is not without problems,
though, and here we address two of these: (1) Does prospect theory actually apply to political decision-makers,
or are politicians unlike the rest of us? (2) Which dimension do politicians use as their reference point when
there are multiple dimensions (e.g., votes and policy)? We address both problems in an experiment with a
unique sample of Dutch members of parliament as participants. We use well-known (incentivized) decision
situations and newly developed hypothetical political decision-making scenarios. Our results indicate that
politicians’ deviate from expected utility theory in the direction predicted by prospect theory but that these
deviations are somewhat smaller than those of other people. Votes appear to be a more important determinant
of politicians’ reference point than is policy.
KEY WORDS: prospect theory, reflection effect, probability weighting, politicians, experiment, elite decision-making
Over the past decades, psychologists and behavioral economists have produced an extensive
body of research demonstrating that people deviate systematically from the predictions of expected
utility theory by falling prey to decision-making biases (see, e.g., Camerer, 2003; Starmer, 2000).
These findings are relevant for political scientists, since expected utility theory is the basis of rational
choice—still a, or even the, dominant approach in many fields of political science (e.g., Bueno de
Mesquita, 1981; Mearsheimer, 2001; for a recent discussion on the usefulness of rational choice
theory, see Hug, 2014).
Two of the most prominent deviations from expected utility theory are probability weighting and
the reflection effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Probability weighting implies that people do not
treat probabilities linearly and are very sensitive to the possibility of ensuring a sure outcome. The
reflection effect means that peoples’ risk attitudes are influenced by whether outcomes are framed as
gains or losses: for losses they are generally risk taking, but for gains they are risk averse. Prospect
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) is a theory of decision-making
under risk and uncertainty that incorporates the body of research demonstrating deviations from
expected utility theory. The choice regularities incorporated in prospect theory have been confirmed
101
0162-895X VC 2016 The Authors. Political Psychology published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of International Society of Political Psychology.
350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ,
and PO Box 378 Carlton South, 3053 Victoria, Australia
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction
in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.
Political Psychology, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2017
doi: 10.1111/pops.12335
bs_bs_banner
by numerous studies (Starmer, 2000), mostly using student samples. However, behavior in line with
prospect theory has also been confirmed for the general population (Booij, van Praag, & van de
Kuilen, 2009), military decision-makers (Haerem, Kuvaas, Bakken, & Karlsen, 2011), physicians
(McNeil, Pauker, Sox, & Tversky, 1982), patients (Eraker & Sox, 1981), and tax payers (Chang,
Nichols, & Schultz, 1987). Prospect theory also explains many real-world examples of deviations
from expected utility theory (Camerer, 2003).
Political psychologists have been quick to incorporate insights from prospect theory, especially
the reflection effect, in their work (Levy, 2003; McDermott, 2004; Mercer, 2005; Vis, 2011).1 Exam-
ples include studies of when governments pursue electorally risky reforms (Vis, 2010; Vis &
Van Kersbergen, 2007), why individuals participate in collective action (Fanis, 2004), when states use
extensive resources to resolve trade disputes with limited potential benefits (Elms, 2004), why some
Latin American leaders pursue painful neoliberal adjustments (Weyland, 2002), and why some demo-
cratic leaders engage in international conflicts (McDermott, 1998; Taliaferro, 2004). These and other
applications notwithstanding, prospect theory’s impact in political science has been limited. This may
be because of the potential problems that arise when applying prospect theory to political decision-
making (Levy, 2003; Mercer, 2005). Our study addresses two of these problems.
The first and main problem we focus on is prospect theory’s applicability to decisions by politi-
cians. Prospect theory has been developed based on experiments with as participants students or, less
often, members of the general population. But does the evidence for prospect theory also hold for pol-
iticians? Based on existing studies, the answer to this question is inconclusive. In this study, we there-
fore test this question directly.
The studies in political psychology we mentioned earlier typically suggest that prospect
theory is applicable to politicians because it can explain political phenomena that expected util-
ity theory cannot explain. However, because politicians may differ substantially from the gen-
eral population, prospect theory could also not be applicable to politicians. First, politicians
face decisions with uncertain outcomes on a regular basis and, without making any normative
judgment, this makes them experienced in these types of decisions. Whether experienced
decision-makers are also more likely to behave in line with expected utility theory is an open
question though. Some studies find they are (List, 2004), while others demonstrate they are not
(Frechette, 2009). Second, politicians are a very select group; selected by themselves (Mattozzi
& Merlo, 2008), their party (Rahat, 2007), and the electorate (Besley, 2005). They are selected
based on certain characteristics, which possibly differ from the average person’s. This process
could select good decision-makers who may be less likely to violate a normative decision-
making theory such as expected utility theory. Third, a few studies that examine politicians’
attitudes toward risk directly suggest that these attitudes differ from those of the general popula-
tion (Fatas, Neugebauer, & Tamborero, 2007; Hess, von Scheve, Schupp, & Wagner, 2013).
Thus, while the success of prospect theory in explaining political phenomena suggests that pros-
pect theory accurately describes politicians’ decision-making, the studies on expert decision-makers
suggest it may not. However, none of these studies provides direct evidence of prospect theory’s
applicability to politicians. To directly test the competing expectations, we need an experimental
design that is similar to existing studies—and thereby able to establish prospect theory’s applicabil-
ity—yet includes the “right” participants: politicians. Our experimental design does exactly this.2 This
design contributes to existing observational studies applying prospect theory since the latter cannot
irrefutably demonstrate causal effects. Such studies show that prospect theory can explain an observed
pattern, but they cannot assess if the behavior predicted by prospect theory is the causal effect
1 Political scientists focus mainly on the value function proposed by prospect theory instead of on probability weight-
ing. Both probability weighting and the value function predict the reflection effect.
2 For details, see below and the online supporting information which is also available at www.highriskpolitics.org.
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(Palfrey, 2009). Our experiment instead provides direct evidence on prospect theory’s applicability to
political decision-making by examining politicians’ decisions in a controlled environment.
The second problem of applying prospect theory to political decision-making relates to the identi-
fication of the reference point. Determining the reference point is always challenging because a theory
of the reference point is absent (Boettcher III, 2004; Levy, 1997). But with outcomes in multiple
dimensions, as is typically the case in political decision-making (e.g., a booming economy [gain] ver-
sus an unsuccessful military intervention [loss]), determining the reference point is particularly chal-
lenging. Behavioral decision research demonstrates that individuals find making decisions with
outcomes in multiple dimensions difficult (Renshon & Renshon, 2008, p. 517), not least emotionally
(i.e., how to sacrifice one value/issue over another?).
Two important dimensions for politicians are the electoral dimension and the policy dimension
(Harmel & Janda, 1994; M€uller & Strøm, 1999). Without a theory of the reference point, it is impossi-
ble to predict whether a politician is more likely to take a risk-taking decision or a risk-averse one
when she faces a loss in one dimension (e.g., an economic crisis) and a gain in another (e.g., gaining
seats in the polls). Two of our decision problems examine whether politicians reveal a reflection effect
in the vote or economic policy outcomes dimension. A third problem explores which of these dimen-
sions dominates when decisions have consequences in terms of both votes and economic policy
outcomes.
The participants in our experiment come from a unique sample of Dutch parliamentarians (MPs,
members of the lower chamber, de Tweede Kamer, n5 46, i.e., 30% of all parliamentarians), for
which we collected data. The Dutch case lends itself well for testing whether politicians’ decision-
making is in line with prospect theory. The specifics of the Dutch political system, such as its nation-
wide party-list system and the high degree of proportionality, make it so that MPs do not need to be
concerned with individual constituencies. This makes our experiment as clean as possible. Perhaps
more importantly, MPs in the Netherlands are selected primarily by the party leadership. Such leaders
have an incentive to select “experts,” who would presumably be more likely to act in accordance with
normative theories on decision-making such as expected utility theory. This makes the Dutch case a
difficult case to find support for prospect theory. Given that existing work demonstrates that prospect
theory’s predictions hold in a variety of Western democracies (Post, Van den Assem, Baltussen, &
Thaler, 2008; Shen & Chih, 2005)—but not necessarily in other contexts (such as China, see
Brumagim and Xianhua 2005)—our findings should be generalizable to other Western democracies.
To assess whether our experimental design results in the well-established findings on prospect theory,
we have also run the experiment with a student sample (n5 176, see Appendix E in the online sup-
porting information). The results of our experiment with the student sample are generally in line with
existing findings.
Our main findings are that politicians exhibit the reflection effect, avoiding risk when outcomes
are (framed as) gains and taking risks when outcomes are (framed as) losses, although we do not find
this in all hypothetical political decision-making scenarios. We also find suggestive evidence for the
weighting of probabilities. However, politicians do not exhibit another common deviation from
expected utility theory, the common ratio effect. These findings increase our understanding of the
microfoundations of political actors’ decision-making under conditions of risk. Since most articles in
political science using prospect theory base their hypotheses on the reflection effect, our article
strengthens the validity of these studies’ findings. At the same time, our results suggest some caution
when applying other predictions of prospect theory directly to political decision-making.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. First, we discuss the main deviations from
expected utility theory we focus on: probability weighting and the reflection effect. Next, we discuss
existing studies’ findings on risky decision-making by politicians. Subsequently, we present our
empirical design and results. The last section concludes.
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Deviations From Expected Utility Theory: Probability Weighting and Reflection Effect
Although risk has several meanings in everyday language, for example as a close synonym for
danger, in decision theory the risk of an option is the degree of uncertainty about a decision’s out-
come. This risk is most commonly measured by the outcome’s variance. A choice is defined as risk
taking (averse) if for two options with an equal expected value the decision-maker prefers the option
with the higher (lower) variance. Risk is clearly important in political decision-making since politi-
cians can hardly ever be sure about their actions’ consequences. Examples include questions like:
Will a new economic stimulus plan have the desired effect? Will a foreign intervention succeed? Will
a new policy platform attract more votes?
Expected utility and prospect theory are the two most popular theories on decision-making under
risk. Whereas expected utility theory prescribes how people should behave if they want to fulfill a
number of attractive axioms, prospect theory aims to describe how people do behave. Expected utility
is used as a descriptive theory as well, but ample evidence has shown that it fails in this respect
(Starmer, 2000). Expected utility theory’s prescriptions imply that people should make consistent
choices, while prospect theory aims to explain why people deviate systematically from these
prescriptions.
In expected utility theory, a (risky) option’s expected utility is the sum of each possible out-
come’s utility multiplied by the probability of the outcome’s occurrence. Consequently, preferences
are independent of the circumstances; only the outcomes’ probabilities and their utility matter; and
probabilities have a linear effect on the option’s value. The shape of the utility function fully deter-
mines decision-makers’ preferences toward risk: they are risk averse (taking) when utility is concave
(convex) in terms of outcomes. Concave utility implies that each additional unit of a good is less valu-
able than the last, for example, an extra apple is more valuable when you only have one apple than if
you have two. This diminishing marginal value, or the shape of the utility function, defines risk atti-
tudes in expected utility theory.
Prospect theory, conversely, indicates that risk attitudes are not only determined by the out-
comes’ utility but also by the reference point’s location and through probability weighting. Our
experiment focuses on these behavioral regularities. Probability weighting means that, unlike in
expected utility theory, the effect of an outcome’s probability on an option’s perceived value is
not linear. Particularly, small probabilities (generally p< 0.33, see Wakker, 2010, pp. 203–206)
are overweighed and large probabilities are underweighted. Intuitively the idea behind this is
that small deviations from absolute certainty (either 0% or 100% chance) have a large impact
on perceptions, but a change in probability when something is already uncertain (e.g., a change
from 20% to 80% probability) has less of an impact. Probabilities are generally underweighted;
people act as if something is less likely to occur than it actually is. Figure 1 presents a prospect-
theoretical probability weighting function.
The reflection effect is the behavioral regularity that people try to avoid risk when facing
gains, but they embrace risk when facing losses. Probability weighting contributes to this behav-
ior. Because probabilities are generally underweighted, the chance of a good outcome receives
too little weight, making a gamble for gains look less attractive. The probability of a bad out-
come is also underweighted, so a gamble over losses looks more attractive. Diminishing sensi-
tivity strengthens this effect because this leads to a utility function that is concave for gains and
convex for losses. However, because small probabilities are overweighed, people prefer a cer-
tain loss of equal expected value over a small probability of a large loss and prefer a small prob-
ability of a large gain over its expected value. Taken together, this leads to a fourfold pattern:
risk aversion for gains and risk taking for losses, but risk taking for unlikely gains and risk aver-
sion for unlikely losses. This pattern is one of the “major phenomena of choice” that Tversky
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and Kahneman (1992, p. 298) try to explain with prospect theory. A meta-analysis by
K€uhberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, and Perner (1999) confirms this general pattern.3
The reflection effect has been used regularly in political science, for example, to explain when
governments pursue reforms (Vis, 2010; Vis & Van Kersbergen, 2007) or how leaders behave during
international conflicts (McDermott, 1998; Taliaferro, 2004). The overweighting of small probabilities
has been used to explain why politicians often advocate spending considerable resources to eliminate
even the smallest chance of a bad outcome in international relations (Levy, 2003).
In addition to the reflection effect and probability weighting, we also explored another prominent
feature of prospect theory in our experiment: loss aversion. Loss aversion predicts that because losses
hurt more than gains please, people are risk averse if they can both gain and lose money. This is
reflected in a utility function that is steeper for losses than it is for gains. Loss aversion is typically
found in existing work (though not always; see, e.g., Ert & Erev, 2010). In our experiment, however,
we did not find it in our student sample (see Appendix E in the online supporting information) and
also not in our politicians sample. The first finding suggests that there might be an issue with the valid-
ity of the tasks testing for loss aversion, because of which we cannot draw meaningful conclusions for
the politicians sample based on these tasks.4
Existing Studies’ on Risky Decision-Making by Politicians
What do existing studies focusing explicitly on politicians or other elite decision-makers con-
clude about these actors’ decision-making under risk? Do politicians and other elite decision-makers
behave like the rest of us? List and Mason (2011) find that CEOs are not more likely to behave
Figure 1. Example of a probability weighting function. The x-axis displays the actual probability and the y-axis displays
the weighted probability.
3 For small probabilities, K€uhberger et al. (1999) do not always find risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses
but often behavior close to risk neutrality.
4 Not finding evidence for loss aversion can be explained by the fact that our participants do not lose their own money
in the experiment. Instead, losses were created by giving participants a sure amount from which they could lose. This
may not be enough to induce a real feeling of loss since participants may see the fixed amount as house money
(Thaler & Johnson, 1990). That this manipulation did reveal the reflection effect suggests that the reflection effect
may be more a feature of the nonlinear weighting of probabilities, while loss aversion is a genuine feature of a per-
son’s preferences as prospect theory suggests.
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according to expected utility theory than are other people. Specifically, List and Mason find that prob-
ability weighting—a key feature of prospect theory as we discussed above—is in fact much stronger
for CEOs than for their student control sample. Also, Haerem et al.’s (2011) military decision-makers
fail to behave as predicted by expected utility theory. However, the military decision-makers’ behav-
ior does not accord to prospect theory’s predictions either. Instead, these actors are risk taking, inde-
pendent of whether outcomes are framed as gains or as losses, while prospect theory predicts risk
aversion in the gain domain. Nevertheless, conflicting expected utility theory’s predictions, the mili-
tary decision-makers were affected by the loss or gain frame since they became (even) more risk tak-
ing when outcomes where framed as losses.
The only study that directly tests prospect theory’s predictions on a sample of politicians is
Fatas et al.’s (2007) replication of Quattrone and Tversky’s (1988) experiment on political
choices. Quattrone and Tversky found evidence for the reflection effect and loss aversion
among their sample (consisting of students) in hypothetical political decision-making scenar-
ios. Fatas et al. presented these decision problems to a sample of 309 students (the control
group with no expertise in political choice) and a sample of 32 elected politicians (“experts” in
political choice). Fatas et al. found that reference-point effects did not disappear in the sample
of politicians. Still, Fatas et al. also found significant differences between the expert (politi-
cians) and nonexpert (student) samples regarding reference-point manipulations and decisions
under risk. The latter results suggest that politicians might differ from the general population.
However, Fatas et al. do not focus on politicians per se, but on politicians who could be
expected to have strong expertise in decision-making under risk: politicians with a Ph.D. in
economics—hardly representative for politicians in general. Although similar in terms of edu-
cational background, their participants came from very different political arenas (e.g., Euro-
pean parliament versus elected mayors), who may behave differently from one another.
Compared to Fatas et al., we have a larger sample of politicians all of whom are MPs who were
not selected on the basis of their educational background. Furthermore, instead of focusing on
political decision problems only, our study also includes decision problems that have been used
many times before to reveal deviations from expected utility.
Other studies examining politicians’ decisions under risk typically do not test prospect theory’s
predictions directly, but they offer insights about politicians’ general attitude toward risk. Hess et al.
(2013) find that German Members of Parliament take more risks than the general population. This
may be related to politicians being highly selected (see the introduction of our article). If the selection
process has a tournament structure, where many candidates compete for a political office, this struc-
ture could select people who are more willing to take risk (Hvide, 2002). Kam (2012) shows that
Americans who are more risk taking are more likely to participate in political life. These studies are
more in line with the assumption that risk attitude is largely a stable personality trait (see also Ehrlich
& Maestas, 2010) and not something that is shaped by the context in which a decision is made (e.g.,
whether an outcome is a loss or a gain).5 However, general risk attitudes may interact with context
effects. People who are generally more willing to take risks do so both in the loss and in the gain
domains (Kam & Simas, 2012; Kowert & Hermann, 1997). This finding could mean that due to politi-
cians’ tendency to take risks, we do not confirm the reflection effect for them, but we find, for exam-
ple, that they are risk taking for gains and even more risk taking for losses—as Haerem et al. (2011)
found for military decision makers.
All in all, studies focusing on decision-making under risk by politicians and other elite decision-
makers suggests that politicians may well deviate from expected utility theory in the same way other
people do, but also that they may deviate less.
5 Attitudes toward risk can also be influenced by other variables, such as idiosyncratic, cultural, political, or ideological
ones (Levy, 1992).
106 Linde and Vis
Experimental Design and Results
To test whether politicians are similar to the rest of us, that is, behave in line with prospect
theory’s predictions, we presented participants in our experiment with a total of 13 decision tasks in
three parts. Part I consisted of six choices between two lotteries (so-called lottery-choice tasks) and
tested expected utility theory’s (EUT) main deviations. Part II consisted of three lottery-valuation
tasks that tested for prospect theory’s fourfold pattern (see the second section). Part III included four
hypothetical political decision-making scenarios that tested whether prospect theory’s predictions,
specifically the reflection effect, are also observed in hypothetical choice situations relating more
directly to politicians’ real-world decision-making.
In Parts I and II, we used well-established problems from the literature, allowing us to compare
our findings to a large body of existing work. Conversely, except for the standard “Asian disease”
problem, the newly developed problems in Part III assessed the effect and importance of two different
dimensions: votes and (economic) policy outcomes. We discuss the tasks’ details prior to their results.
In all tasks, the probabilities of possible outcomes are known. In most real-life decision situations,
probabilities are unknown, a situation referred to as uncertainty or ambiguity in decision science.
However, research shows that behavior is relatively similar under risk and under ambiguity (see
Trautmann & Van de Kuilen, 2016 for a discussion). To keep things simple for our participants, we
therefore use known probabilities in our experiment.
To validate the tasks, we ran the experiment with a student sample.6 Here we only discuss the
results of the politicians; Appendix E in the online supporting information presents the results for the
student sample. To prevent order effects, we presented participants with the three parts in a random
order. Additionally, we randomized the order of tasks within the parts (e.g., the order of the six lot-
teries in Part I). Appendix A in the online supporting information provides an English translation of
the instructions for all three parts of the experiment.
Task-related incentives, that is, incentives based on what happens during the task (such as partici-
pants’ choices) (Bardsley et al., 2010), give participants a reason to take the task seriously (i.e., to gen-
erate experimental realism, cf. Druckman & Kam, 2011, p. 44). They also reduce participants’
tendency to provide socially desirable responses (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; see Bardsley et al.,
2010: chap. 6 for an extensive discussion on incentives).7 The latter may be especially relevant for
politicians since Caprara, Barbaranelli, and Zimbardo (2003) found, based on a comparison between
103 Italian politicians and a large sample of the general public (n5 4,578), that politicians scored sig-
nificantly higher on the personality characteristic social desirability. Therefore, we provided financial
incentives to our politician participants for the lottery-choice and lottery-valuation tasks. Politicians
cannot be paid for participation in an experiment in the regular way. Instead, we used incentives in
the form of a contribution to a charity that the participant could pick from seven well-known char-
ities.8,9 To make each decision that includes a monetary payoff relevant, but simultaneously ensure
that tasks do not influence each other, we randomly selected one task that determined how much
money was donated to the charity on behalf of the participant. Specifically, we randomly selected
either the lottery-choice or the lottery-valuation part of the experiment, and then we randomly selected
one task from this part. This avoided that participants’ choices were influenced by so-called portfolio
6 Druckman and Kam (2011) demonstrate that a convenience sample of students does not pose a problem for a study’s
external validity.
7 Although the use of task-related incentives is not common (yet?) in political science, it is the norm in experimental
economics. For example, every single study based on experiments in the flagship economics journal, The American
Economic Review, published between 1970 and 1997 used task-related incentives (Bardsley et al., 2010, p. 244).
8 Amnesty International; Cordaid; Dutch Cancer Society (KWF Kankerbestrijding); Oxfam Novib; Prins Bernhard Cul-
tuurfonds (charity focusing on cultural heritage); Red Cross; and World Wildlife Fund.
9 See Appendix E in the online supporting information for information on incentives in the student sample.
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effects (e.g., some safe and some risky choices for a balanced portfolio) or by previous earnings
(Starmer & Sugden, 1991).
A total of 46 Members of Parliament (i.e., 30% of the Dutch parliament) participated in the
experiment, which they performed online in the presence of at least one of the researchers. The num-
ber of participants per session varied (from 1 to 25), but since the experiment was done individually
and in silence, this did not influence our results. The first experimental session was in September 2014
and the last one in January 2015. During this period, there were no elections or other high-profile
political events. Of the participating MPs, 28% were female (a bit less than the 37% female MPs in
parliament), 81% were university-educated (in line with the full population of MPs), their average age
was 43.5 (idem), and 76.2% described their political position as (very) right-wing (substantially more
than the around 50% right-wing MPs in parliament).
Probability Weighting
Common Ratio Effect, Lottery-Choice Tasks 1 And 2. Our first two lottery-choice tasks (see
Table 1 and Appendix B in the online supporting information for a more detailed discussion) assess
the presence of probability weighting by examining whether a common ratio effect exists (Allais,
1953; see Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984). In lottery-choice tasks 1 and 2, the expected utility of
C is one-fourth that of A and that of D is one-fourth that of B. According to EUT, the ranking of A
and B should thus be the same as that of C and D. However, in many earlier studies, and in our own
student sample (see Appendix E in the online supporting information), participants choose the riskier
option (B and D, a smaller probability to earn a larger amount) more often in problem 2 than in prob-
lem 1. Prospect theory explains this deviation from EUT through probability weighting: the difference
between 100% and 80% is seen as large because 80% probability is underweighted, which makes A
relatively attractive. The difference between 25% and 20% is seen as small; both are pretty small
probabilities, so they are not or hardly underweighted, making D relatively more attractive. If there is
a common ratio effect, the predictions for task 1 and 2 are A and D.
As Table 1 shows, we do not find the common ratio effect for politicians. Although the risky
option is chosen 9% more often in problem 2 than it is in problem 1, this effect is far from significant.
For both these tasks and the reflection effect tasks (see Table 3 below), we explored whether the prob-
ability of exhibiting the effect depends on several background variables (age, ideology, time in parlia-
ment, and gender), but none of these had a significant effect.
Lottery-Valuation Tasks. The lottery-valuation tasks explored probability weighting more gener-
ally. Here we briefly discuss the design; Appendix C in the online supporting information presents a
more detailed discussion. The design of our lottery-valuation tasks is similar to Tversky and
Table 1. Common Ratio Problem (n5 46)
Task Percentage of Politicians Choosing Risky Option
Task 1
A) e28 for sure
or
B) e40 with 80% probability and e0 with 20% probability
63.04%
Task 2
C) e28 with 25% probability and e0 with 75% probability
or
D) e40 with 20% probability and e0 with 80% probability
71.74%
Difference (percentage points) 8.70%
p-value binomial-test 0.4545
Note. The predictions in case of a common ratio effect are displayed in bold.
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Kahneman (1992). Each participant is presented with three lotteries, either framed as gains (where
outcomes are either e0 or e40) or as losses (where outcomes are either –e40 or e0). Each participant
gets one lottery where the best outcome’s probability is 10%, one where this probability is 50%, and
one where this probability is 90%. We compensate participants for their potential losses by adding the
maximum amount that could be lost in the lottery to the amount donated to the charity, independent
of their choices. Then, the gain and loss treatments have exactly the same payoffs and the difference
between the treatments is purely a difference in framing—which is precisely what we need. Partici-
pants’ valuation for the lotteries is determined using a so-called multiple-price list; the method we
used allows for a valid elicitation of valuations (see Appendix C in the online supporting information
for the details).
The results of the lottery-valuation tasks, presented in Table 2, provide suggestive evidence for
probability weighting, although it should be stressed that none of the observed differences are signifi-
cant due to a lack of power. Looking at the gain treatment, the politicians were, on average, willing to
pay 16 cents more than the expected value of the lottery with a 10% chance of winning. A willingness
to pay more than a lottery’s expected value is in line with prospect theory because the small probabil-
ity of 10% is overweighed.
Prospect theory predicts that the larger probabilities of 50% and 90% are underweighted. Conse-
quently, people are risk averse and are willing to pay less for the lottery than its expected value. We
find this for the lottery with a 90% probability of winning but not for the lottery with a 50% probabil-
ity of winning. None of the differences between the treatments are significant, nor are the valuations
significantly different from the expected value.
Taking lottery-choice tasks 1 and 2 and the lottery-valuation tasks together, there is some evi-
dence that politicians suffer from probability weighting, but this evidence is weak. The responses go
in the direction expected by prospect theory, but the treatment effects are not statistically significant.
For the lottery-valuation task, a lack of power prevents strong conclusions, but the results from
lottery-choice tasks 1 and 2 suggest that politicians may behave somewhat more in line with expected
utility theory than other people since they do not exhibit (strong) effects of probability weighting.10
Reflection Effect
Lottery-choice tasks 5 and 6 test for the presence of the reflection effect (see Table 3), the finding
that people are risk averse when outcomes are presented as gains and risk taking when they are pre-
sented as losses. In task 5, outcomes are presented as gains; in task 6 as losses. Because participants
receive an additional e60 in task 6, the tasks are exactly the same in terms of final outcomes.
Table 2. Lottery-Valuation Tasks, Average Difference Between the Valuation and the Expected Value of the Gain and
Loss Treatments Lotteries for the Politicians Sample (n5 28)
Probability of Highest Amount Gain Treatment Loss Treatment
10% e0.16 – e0.25
50% e0.28 e0.75
90% – e0.41 e1.13
Note. The sample size is smaller than the full sample since participants were presented with either the gain, mixed, or
loss lotteries, and those presented with the mixed lotteries are not reported.
10 We included one more task to explore probability weighting, a test of the so-called common consequence effect (see,
e.g., Huck and M€uller [2012] and Appendix B for an explanation of the task and Appendix E, Table E.2, in the online
supporting information for the results). Because we did not confirm this effect in the student sample, we cannot draw
definitive conclusions from this test for the politicians. However, the fact that we also do not confirm the effect for
politicians is a further indication that politicians are similar to other people.
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Cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) explains the reflection effect as follows.
Probability weighting is cumulative: It is the chance to get an outcome further from the reference
point that is weighted, so in decision problem 5, the 33% chance to get e60 is weighted, while in deci-
sion problem 6, the 67% chance to get –e60 is weighted. Because both probabilities are of moderate
size, they are underweighted (especially the 67%), leading to risk aversion for gains and risk taking
for losses. Since 33% is likely to be underweighted less than 67%, the prediction is that more people
will choose the risky option (C) in problem 6 than in problem 5 (A). Table 3 shows that we find a
strong reflection effect. The risky option is almost twice as popular when outcomes are presented as
losses. Clearly, politicians are very vulnerable to the framing of outcomes as gains or losses.
Also comparing the valuation of lotteries in the gain and loss treatments presented in Table 2
indicates that politicians exhibit a reflection effect. They are risk averse for small probability losses
and large probability gains and risk seeking for large probability losses and small probability gains.
However, it should again be noted that the results for the lottery-valuation task are not statistically
significant.
Hypothetical Political Decision-Making Scenarios. Given that we find a strong reflection effect
in the lottery-choice and lottery-valuation parts, we can explore: (1) whether politicians also exhibit
this effect in hypothetical political decisions and (2) which dimension, votes or policy, dominates
when outcomes are gains in one dimension and losses in another. To this end, we present our partici-
pants with newly developed hypothetical political decision-making scenarios.
The scenarios use outcome dimensions that are important in decisions regularly made by politi-
cians (votes and economic policy outcomes). However, the scenarios remain a simplification of real-
ity; they are not intended to be truly mundane. In the trade-off between experimental realism and
manipulation control (Iyengar, 2011), we opt for control because this offers the best setting for identi-
fying the dimension used as a reference point. We ask the participant to advise her parliamentary cau-
cus to vote for or against a proposal,11 which is a decision MPs face regularly and make individually
(with advice from their staff). Prospect theory is a theory on individual decisions (as is expected utility
theory), so this decision stays as close as possible to the theory and to our research question.12
We tell our participants to assume that (1) the proposal has no other consequences than those
mentioned in the question, (2) there is no better alternative proposal available, (3) their caucus is
Table 3. Reflection Effect Problem (n5 46)
Task Percentage of Politicians Choosing Risky Option
Task 5
A) e60 with 33% probability and
e0 with 67% probability
or
B) e20 for sure
39.13%
Task 6
C) e0 with 33% probability and –e60 with 67% probability
or
D) –e40 for sure
76.09%
Difference (in percentage points) 36.96%
p-value binomial-test 0.0002
Note. The predictions in case of a reflection effect are displayed in bold.
11 In our student sample, participants were asked to put themselves in the position of a MP.
12 How an individual politician’s decision influences the outcome of the political process depends on many factors, such
as the procedural rules or the power of different actors (Kerr, MacCoun, & Kramer, 1996). Still, existing evidence
(Charness, Karni, & Levin, 2007; Rockenbach, Sadrieh, & Mathauschek, 2007) indicates that groups violate expected
utility just as individuals do, although they may be somewhat more rational.
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ideologically neutral towards the proposal, and (4) their vote choice is not affected by any potential
coalition agreements. We do not expect our participants to fully conform to these assumptions. How-
ever, stating these four assumptions explicitly likely reduces the probability that different participants
take different decisions because they view the decision-situation differently.
Every question is preceded by a description of the situation and the consequences of a vote in
favor or against. In all scenarios, participants have to choose between a relatively risky (high variance
in outcomes) and a relatively safe (low variance in outcomes) option in either a loss or a gain treat-
ment. All four scenarios thus test for the presence of the reflection effect but they do so in different
settings. Despite our instruction not to let ideology play a role, it may still be the case that left-wing
politicians take different decisions than do right-wing politicians. This does not interfere with testing
whether politicians behave in line with prospect theory’s predictions because prospect theory does not
predict a particular choice but an effect of the framing of the decision situation. To further reduce the
effect of ideology, we never describe an actual policy over which the participants may have preferen-
ces, but we only describe the (expected) consequences of implementing the policy.
The first setting is the classical Asian disease problem (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), presented
as a choice between voting in favor of implementing program A or voting against it in which case pro-
gram B is implemented. In the gain treatment, the program’s effects are described as follows: Program
A is implemented with 200 people saved, or Program B is implemented with a one-third probability
that 600 people are saved and a two-thirds probability that 0 people are saved. In the loss treatment,
the program’s description is as follows: Program A is implemented and 400 people will die, or Pro-
gram B is implemented with a one-third probability that 0 people will die and a two-thirds probability
that 600 people will die.
In the second, third, and fourth settings, we manipulate gains and losses by changing the earlier
expectations. The current situation is either described as better (gain setting) or worse (loss setting)
than these earlier expectations. Earlier expectations are manipulated such that in absolute terms, the
outcomes are the same. This is the same procedure as Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 273) used in
two of their decision problems (11 and 12). The potential results of voting in favor of the proposal or
against it are explained in words and presented in a table outlining the changes relative to the earlier
expectations. Appendix D in the online supporting information presents the complete scenarios.
In the second setting, outcomes based on macroeconomic policy outcomes—unemployment and
budget deficits—define losses and gains. We choose this setting because politicians care about these
outcomes, independent of their ideology. In the third setting, outcomes are gains and losses with
respect to the votes for the decision-maker’s party. The fourth setting includes outcomes that are either
gains in terms of votes and losses in terms of economic growth, or vice versa (i.e., a multidimensional
trade-off).
Our hypothetical decision-making scenarios complement those of Quattrone and Tversky (1988),
which take the perspective of a voter rather than of a politician. Our scenarios examine specific deci-
sion situations and are thereby narrower than Quattrone and Tversky’s, allowing us to assess which
dimension the participants take as their reference point.
Because the scenarios with outcomes framed as losses are very similar to those framed as gains,
we present participants with either the loss or the gain treatment. For each scenario, it was randomly
determined whether a participant was presented with the loss or the gain frame, so it was possible that
a participant would get the gain frame for one scenario and a loss frame for another scenario. We also
randomly determined the order of the scenarios.
When directly comparing loss and gain situations, we find a significant reflection effect for the
Asian disease scenario (Table 4), but no significant effect for the other three scenarios. However, for
the scenario with both economic and electoral outcomes, our participants are over 15 percentage
points more likely to choose the risky option when outcomes are losses in votes. This effect becomes
significant at a 5% level if we analyze the data of all political decisions together (n5 164) and control
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for background characteristics such as sex, age, parliamentary experience, and political orientation in
a logistic regression (Table 5). None of the control variables have a significant effect on the likelihood
of choosing the risky option, although men and right-wing politicians may be a little more, and left-
wing politicians a little less, likely to choose the risky option.
Taken together, the findings from the incentivized reflection effect task, the lottery-valuation
tasks and the Asian disease decision task all suggest that, like other people, politicians are susceptible
to the reflection effect. However, in the hypothetical political decisions, our politicians only revealed
the reflection effect in two of the four scenarios. One interpretation of this finding is that politicians
Table 4. Political Decision Problems (n5 46)
Scenarios
Loss Situation
% Choosing Risky Option
Gain Situation
% Choosing Risky Option
Fisher’s Exact
Test p-value
1) Economic Outcomes 45% 50% 0.774
2) Votes 45.83% 40.91% 0.774
3) Votes and Economic
Outcomes (loss/gain in
terms of votes)
85% 69.23% 0.302
4) Asian Disease 88.46% 30% <0.001
Table 5. Logistic Regression of Choosing the Risky Option (dependent variable) on Characteristics of Politicians and
Scenarios (n5 164)
Variables Odds Ratio
Scenario (reference: economic outcomes)
Votes 0.576
[0.435]
Votes and Economic Outcomes 1.904
[0.361]
Asian Disease 0.569
[0.408]
Loss Framing by Scenario
Loss Frame for Economic Outcomes 0.860
[0.827]
Loss Frame for Votes 1.599
[0.490]
Loss Frame for Votes and and Economic Outcomes (loss in terms of votes) 8.684**
[0.033]
Loss Frame Asian Disease 14.633***
[0.001]
Age (years) 1.033
[0.259]
Time in Parliament (months) 0.995
[0.580]
Man 2.077
[0.177]
Right-Wing Politician (reference: centrist) 1.510
[0.500]
Left-Wing Politician (reference: centrist) 0.290
[0.173]
Constant 0.147
[0.140]
Note. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1; p-values, based on robust standard errors clustered at the individual level,
between brackets.
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are less vulnerable to the framing of outcomes if they are more familiar with the type of decision.
Arguably this explains why they do exhibit the effect in the Asian disease example and not in the sce-
narios with electoral or economic consequences. However, that does not explain why they do reveal
the reflection effect in the scenario with votes and economic outcomes, which is probably most similar
to real political decisions. Still, the effect is weaker for this scenario, suggesting that task familiarity
may weaken the reflection effect for politicians.
A possible competing explanation for the lack of a reflection effect in the votes scenario is that
MPs tried to provide socially acceptable answers. Since it is not socially desirable to consider electoral
outcomes, MPs do not carefully consider the votes scenario, but, for example, make a random choice.
Economic outcomes do not lead to a reflection effect because in this scenario, the decision’s conse-
quences do not influence the MP directly and are therefore considered more abstractly, leading to a
decision that is more in line with expected utility theory. When both economic and electoral conse-
quences are at stake, the outcomes are considered carefully, since a flippant decision about economic
consequences would be considered wrong. However, the electoral consequences, which are more
directly relevant for the MP making the decision, grab the attention leading to a reflection effect in
terms of electoral outcomes.13 Note that the reflection effect is much weaker in this last scenario, sug-
gesting that at least some of the MPs managed to suppress the possible urge to let the electoral conse-
quences determine their decision.
Another possible interpretation is that politicians, or people in general, are more likely to exhibit
the reflection effect if the question is more difficult. The Asian disease problem is hard because the
type of decision is highly irregular and the life or death setting adds pressure to the decision. The sce-
narios with votes or economic outcomes are very straightforward, but the scenario with votes and eco-
nomic outcomes is more complicated since it entails trade-offs in different dimensions. Consequently,
the scenario with votes and economic outcomes leads to a (weak) reflection effect. This interpretation
does not explain why this reflection effect is revealed with respect to the votes dimension rather than
the economic dimension when both are present. Both interpretations suggest that it is likely that MPs
exhibit a reflection effect in their real-life decisions since these always entail possible votes and policy
outcomes and are almost always more complicated than the scenarios we presented them with.
In summary, our findings on the reflection effect are as follows. We found strong evidence
for the reflection effect in the two tasks that are used most often to study this effect: the Asian
disease scenario and a choice between lotteries with financial outcomes. In the three political
hypothetical decision-making scenarios, we only found a weaker effect in the scenario with
electoral and economic consequences, rather than only consequences on one of these dimen-
sions. In the scenario with electoral and economic consequences, the direction of the effect sug-
gests that votes function as a reference point. We argue that these findings can be explained by a
reference point in the votes dimension combined with socially acceptable answers, but we can-
not exclude that task familiarity reduces the reflection effect.
Conclusion
Prospect theory has been used quite extensively in political psychology. In political science in
general, prospect theory has not been applied on as wide a scale as might be expected given its poten-
tial to explain decision-making under risk: a central feature of political decision-making. Problems
13 This explanation is in line with the results from our student sample (see Table E.6 in Appendix E in the online sup-
porting information). Like the MPs, the students showed a reflection effect in the Asian disease and the votes and eco-
nomic outcomes scenarios but not for the economic scenario. However, unlike the MPs, they did reveal a reflection
effect in the votes scenario, plausibly because they did not have the same motivation to provide a socially acceptable
answer. Instead, they behaved as they thought politicians would and therefore cared about electoral outcomes.
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that arise when applying prospect theory to such decision-making might be responsible for this. By
means of an experiment with a sample of 46 Dutch members of parliament (i.e., 30% of all MPs), we
addressed two of these problems. First, does prospect theory hold for politicians like it does for the
rest of us? Second, which reference point do politicians use when a decision has implications in more
than one dimension (votes versus economic policy outcomes)?
To address the first problem—prospect theory’s applicability to political actors—we presented
politicians with well-known (incentivized) decision situations used to study decision-making under
risk. The tasks were validated using a student sample. Our findings suggest that politicians, like other
people, display the reflection effect, but, unlike other people, not the common ratio effect. The reflec-
tion effect was also confirmed in the well-known Asian disease problem. The reflection effect is the
element of prospect theory that is most widely applied in political science, and our results validate
these applications. However, our findings also suggest that using other predictions of prospect theory
to explain political behavior might be more problematic.
For the second problem, which reference point politicians use with outcomes in more than one
dimension, our evidence is less strong but nevertheless suggestive. We did not find the reflection
effect when outcomes were framed as economic or electoral consequences. Still, politicians exhibited
the effect, albeit weaker, in the direction suggested by a reference point in terms of votes when there
were both economic and electoral consequences. This suggests that task familiarity may mitigate the
reflection effect, but it can also be explained by a reflection effect in terms of the outcome that influen-
ces the politicians themselves the most—votes—possibly combined with socially acceptable answers.
Some issues are worth examining further. Are our findings influenced by right-wing politicians
being overrepresented in our sample? Unfortunately, our sample is too small to test this. However,
because the principles of expected utility theory resonate more with the ideological stance of right-
wing politicians than with those of left-wing ones, we may assume that if either of the two would
behave more in line with this theory, these would be the right-wing ones. If this is indeed the case, our
sample made it harder to find support for prospect theory, providing a conservative test of prospect
theory for politicians. Still, this is a question worthy of empirical investigation.
All in all, our experimental findings offer grounds for optimism regarding the application of the
reflection effect, although perhaps with a measure of caution. Optimism may also be warranted
regarding the decision-making abilities of politicians since they appear to abide by the normative pre-
scripts of expected utility theory to a greater extent than most other people, although they do exhibit
the reflection effect. The results have increased our understanding of the microfoundations of political
decision-making and thereby make a valuable contribution to the existing observational studies among
other areas of political psychology.
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